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THE YIELDS OF THE HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI EXPLOSIONS by
John Malik ABSTRACT A deterministic estimate of the nuclear radiation fields from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear weapon explosions requires the yields of these explosions.
The yield of the Nagasaki explosion is rather well established by both fireball and radiochemical data from other tests as 21 kt.
There are no equivalent data for the Hiroshima explosion. Equating thermal radiation and blast effects observed at the two cities subsequent to the explosions gives a yield of about 15 kt.
The pressure-vs-time data, obtained by dropped, parachute-retarded canisters and reevaluated using 2-D hydrodynamic calculations, give a yield between 16 and 17 kt. Scaling the gamma-ray dose data and calculations gives a yield of about 15 kt.
Sulfur neutron activation data give a yield of about 15 kt. The current best estimates for the yield of these explosions are the following: Hiroshima 15 kt Nagasaki 21 kt The outside limits of uncertainties in these values are believed to be 20 percent for Hiroshima and 10 percent for Nagasaki.
I.. INTRODUCTION
The Manhattan Project culminated in the design and fabrication of two types of nuclear weapons--Little Boy and Fat Man. The first type was exploded over Hiroshima, the second over Nagasaki.
Estimates of radiation exposures depend in part on explosive yields, and much of the evaluation of radiation effects upon man depends on data from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki explosions. ) , who piloted the instrumentation aircraft from which the canisters were dropped, resolved the problem of the aircraft spacing in the formation.* Uncertainties which still remain include the time from "bomb away" or release tone to parachute deployment, the true altitude, and the gage calibrations. A summary of the missions is given in Tables I and II. IV. NAGASAKI MISSION The plans for the second mission, with the primary target of Kokura, similar to those for Hiroshima, but the execution did not go as planned.g were The problems started before takeoff--a fuel transfer valve was inoperative and fuel in one bomb-bay tank was unavailable; further, R. Serber, who was to have operated the FastaxTM camera in the photographic plane, when drawing equipment * Lord Penney 27 said he questioned the bombardier of the canister aircraft after the mission as to the spacing. He was''completely sure he was very close --100 yd." Beahan, the bombardier, confirmed this. definition of the atmosphere, 4) calibration of the gages, and 5) calculations of the overpressure expected at the gage altitude with yield as a parameter.
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As implied earlier, the aircraft altitude is a necessary parameter; it may have been resolved adequately for the Nagasaki mission but is uncertain for Hiroshima. Three values are given: 31 600 ft from the AF historical records,26 32 700 ft from Parsons" log,l" and 35 000 ft from Alvarez" letter to McCrae25 and from working backward from the timing of the Hiroshima p(t)
record. These and the other assumed parameters for the two missions are given in the test drop conditions determined the drag (terminal speed), which was then used for the combat conditions. A summary of these data and calculations is given in Table IV . The summary of the data and calculations giving the canister position is given in Table V .
The time of fall of the Little Boy is based on test data of tests at
Muroc plus trajectory calculations for other altitudes using the test data to for Hiroshima and Nagasaki as estimated from "historical" records for the aircraft altitudes, ground speeds, and drop test data. Aircraft altitudes are based on shock arrival times at the canisters taken from the pressure-time records (together with aircraft ground speed from "historical" records, drop test data, and Tokyo pressure-temperature soundings for August 6, 1945 One piston rotated inward, the other outward to restore the original volume; they were set to trip at 30 and 40 s. The motions had some overshoot, and extrapolation to zero time was necessary to determine the volume changes. The operating frequencies of the units were 52, 54, and 56 MHz; the receiver output was expected to be about 10 V with about a 60-kHz frequency deviation.
The recorders were Kodak Cine E cameras modified for strip film use photographing a cathode ray oscilloscope. This unit was developed at CIT as the field calibration unit for the Navy.
This unit injected a signal with a known frequency deviation into the receiver.
The unit was used on the mission though now no one on the mission remembers the unit. The calibrations were not used in the field analysis of the data, nor were they used on the Crossroads measurements. The calibration using this unit disagreed by a large factor (3.1 V/mm vs 2.13 V/mm)24 from that of the other two techniques. The problem probably was the large temperature difference (greater than 60°C) between the setup conditions on Tinian and the operating altitude. The relative linear contraction would have been about 10-3.
As inductance of a coil is proportional to about the square of the diameter, and the frequency is proportional to the inverse square root '3 of the operating of the inductance, the frequency shift would be about 10 frequency, which was 54 MHz; a frequency shift of 0.5 MHz could have occurred.
The bandwidth of the system was about 0.1 MHz and the receiver was retuned on the mission to match the transmitter frequency, whereas the FEI box was probably not, therefore the FEI calibration box may not have been at the receiver frequency. This is conjecture but it seems plausible; the value is in the right direction. during Crossroads, where radiochemical debris was collected and fireball radius-vs-time data were obtained.
(Unfortunately, the large bombing error of Able, the air burst, put the burst outside the prime fireball cameras-field of view; only a streak camera record was obtained, however those data are very good.) Table VI As their slant range to the canister is greater than the probable range, this yield is probably an upper limit.
B. Equivalent blast effects scaling
Surveys after the explosions noted distances from ground zero of similar effects due to the blast wave. The data set for comparison is limited but a few comparisons by the same observers and with documentation exist. Damage Calculated yield (kt)a 22
Recommended yield 21 a By R. Osborne, Los Alamos National Laboratory Group X-4.
due to drag effects has been excluded; only those comparisons of damage due to overpressure with a significant number of objects observed were retained. The ground surfaces were far from "ideal;" thermal effects would have produced a precursor to the blast wave and added both smoke and dust loads. In addition, mechanical effects due to the many buildings would have absorbed energy from the wave as well as providing debris to further load the blast wave. 33 The summary of blast data and the comment by Brode 34 suggest simpler models of the height-of-burst effect may be more appropriate. Two such models have been suggested: using by ground range
Scaling by slant more damage than yield dependence.
scaled ground ranges and using scaled slant ranges. Scaling allows for some HOB effects but is independent of HOB.
range implies that the effect of the direct shock results in does the reflected shock. Both postulations have the same
Brode prefers the first but the second appears to be more appropriate. These relations are
where the subscripts ground range (GR), refer to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, W to the yield, X to the and R to the slant range (SR). Taking the Nagasaki explosion yield at 21 kt, Table VII gives the data set and the derived yields for Hiroshima. The average for the Hiroshima yield is about 14.3 kt using ground range scaling and 14.9 using slant range scaling. The average of these is about 15 kt when rounded.
c. UK Yield Evaluation
A group from the Manhattan District, composed of and G. T. Reynolds, was sent to both Hiroshima and W. G. Penney, R. Serber, Nagasaki soon after the explosions to report on physical effects. These surveys have provided much of the information upon which to make estimates of the yields of the two explosions. The results of the survey and samples of damaged objects from the blast wave were analyzed by Lord Penney et al., 5 who concluded that the yield of the Hiroshima explosion was 12 k 1 kt and that of the Nagasaki explosion was 22~2 kt. They used data from objects damaged from the pressure pulse 15 kt a The damaged area was observed to be more elliptical than the implied circular area.
b The petrol can data are believed to be the more credible with damage to buildings as next best.
and by drag. * Calibration was in terms of scale models in high-explosive tests. Unfortunately, the scale used was for a full-scale explosion at the Hiroshima height-of-burst but at 9 kt, requiring an extrapolation for both explosions. They also assumed ideal surfaces in the two cities. Lord Penney has recently reevaluated the data of Reference 5 using US blast data and finds the same results. He also suggests that the vertical velocity gradient can produce turbulence and this may in part explain the nonideal shape of recorded pressure-time records in addition to the distortion produced by thermal effects on the surface. where W is the yield, i the angle of incidence, and E the extinction * An evaluation of the Hiroshima yield using the observation of damage of drag-sensitive objects--lightning rods, flagpoles, etc.--was made at Sandia Corp. in the early 1950s by Shelton. Calibration was by scaled models exposed in a supersonic wind tunnel. Documentation has not been located but the value of yield obtained was 16 kt. F. Shelton, Kaman Sciences, Jan. 10, 1984. coefficient.
The extinction coefficient may be obtained from the measured visibility by the relation e = (ln 50)/V used by meteorologists, where V is the visibility, given as greater than 20 km in both cities. 21 For the data set used and when all surfaces are taken as vertical except for the roof tiles, the ratio of the yields in the two cities WH/WN is given in Table VIII The data on thermoluminescence of roof tiles reported by Ichikawa 46
provides a useful set of measurements for estimating a yield. In particular, the tiles from the Hiroshima University Building HU-2 are of known orientation and distances. SAIC has calculated the TLD dose considering orientation (horizontal) with an assumed yield of 15 kt. The results of their preliminary evaluation* are given in For similar bombs the fluence of high-energy neutrons (that is, those above the sulfur threshold), corrected for atmospheric transmission effects, has been used to scale measured fluences to reference data from a similar device to determine the yield of a nuclear explosion.
A yield determination may be made using data from the activation of sulfur by high-energy neutrons in the reaction 32S(n,p) 32P.
Revision of 
XI. CONCLUSIONS
The yields for the Little Boy used on Hiroshima, as derived from the various methods, are summarized in Table X . From these evaluations, the value of 15 kt is estimated with a 20-percent uncertainty. This is twice the uncertainty applied to radiochemical and fireball yield evaluations with good data and seems appropriate for the indirect methods required to estimate the yield of the Hiroshima explosion.
The recommended yields for the two explosions are as follows:
Hiroshima 15 kt Nagasaki 21 kt , where the value is believed to have an outside limit of 20 percent for Hiroshima and 10 percent for Nagasaki. 
